This paper analyses the implications of heterogeneity in the type of downward wage rigidity (nominal or real) for optimal monetary policy in a monetary union with asymmetric wage adjustment costs. Indexation in one region of the union reduces optimal grease inflation in the presence of common productivity shocks. Large common shocks may have sizeable and persistent effects on the intra-union terms of trade, whereby the region characterized by downward real wage rigidity adjusts with a persistent loss of competitiveness. In response to asymmetric productivity shocks, there is no role for grease inflation because relative price changes facilitating the real wage changes dominate the adjustment mechanism.
I. Introduction
Recent empirical research has highlighted the presence of downward wage rigidities (DWR) in a large number of countries. Dickens et al. (2007) summarise the findings of the International Wage Flexibility Project. Investigating the shape and skewness of wage change distributions, this paper finds clear evidence of both nominal and real downward wage rigidity in a number of countries. The extent of downward nominal versus real wage rigidity differs, however, across countries and is related to differences in labour market institutions, such as the strength of trade unions, the coverage of wage agreements, and the presence of indexation. Within the context of the Eurosystem Wage Dynamics Network (WDN), Messina et al. (2010) confirm and update some of these findings, quantifying the extent of downward wage rigidity across a number of European countries. Within EMU, one interesting case characterised by prevalent downward real wage rigidity (DRWR) is Spain, which still has a system of widespread indexation of wages to positive changes in consumer prices. Another case characterised more by strong downward nominal wage rigidity (DNWR) is Portugal, where wage cuts for job stayers are prohibited by law. These findings are confirmed by recent survey evidence collected in many EU countries; see Babecký et al. (2009) .
Although the micro evidence indicates the existence of DWR, it is not obvious to what extent these rigidities are also relevant for employment adjustment over the business cycle at a more aggregate level. Indeed, most studies using individual-or firm-level data are restricted to job stayers, while adjustments of labour costs could take place through wage adjustments of new hires and/or compositional changes in the age and skill composition over the business cycle-see, for example, Fuss (2008) . However, Holden and Wulfsberg (2008) analyse wage changes at the industry level for 19 OECD countries over the period and confirm the existence of both nominal and real DWR of different extent across different countries even at this more aggregate level.
In his presidential address to the American Economic Association, Tobin (1972) argued that in the presence of DNWR, inflation helps to improve the adjustment within the labour market, as it reduces the necessity for nominal wage cuts. Since then, a number of papers have modelled the presence of DNWR and investigated the implications for the optimal rate of inflation and monetary policy. For example, using US data, Akerlof et al. (1996) argue that the optimal inflation rate is close to 3%. More recently, using a closed-economy model estimated on US data, Kim and Ruge-Murcia (2009) find that a much lower, but still positive, inflation objective greases the wheels of the economy in the face of DNWR and that price adjustments compensate for the lower flexibility in the wage setting. A related recent paper is Fagan and Messina (2009) , who use a flexible menu cost model to match wage change distributions at the micro level in a number of countries and who investigate the implications for optimal steady-state inflation. 1 In this paper, we contribute to this literature by investigating the monetary policy implications in a model in which different regions exhibit different types of DWR (i.e., DNWR versus DRWR), as has been documented for different countries in EMU. We set up a two-region monetary union model along the lines of Benigno (2004) , Galí and Monacelli (2008) , and Poilly and Sahuc (2008) , with costs of adjusting prices and wages in the spirit of Rotemberg (1982) . The labour market is monopolistically competitive, as in Erceg et al. (2000) .
2 Following Kim and Ruge-Murcia (2009) , wage adjustment costs are asymmetric and larger for downward than upward wage changes. Moreover, in view of the empirical evidence for some of the euro area countries discussed above, we allow for real wage rigidity in one of the regions. In this case, asymmetric adjustment costs apply to real wage changes; that is, nominal wages adjusted for current inflation. Finally, in terms of the monetary policy analysis, our paper is related to the literature on optimal monetary policy using second-order approximations of the objective function, as in Benigno and Woodford (2006) , but our methodology uses the second-order perturbation methods applied to the non-linear solution of the model as, for example, those by Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2005) and Darracq Paries et al. (2007) .
Our main findings are two-fold. First, in line with the literature mentioned above, we find a role for a small positive average inflation rate to grease the adjustment of the labour market in the presence of common productivity shocks. However, the presence of indexation (or DRWR) in one of the regions lowers the optimal inflation rate, as in this region inflation does not help the adjustment of real wages. Moreover, heterogeneity in the type of DWR also leads to an asymmetric transmission of the common productivity shock across regions. In particular in response to a large negative productivity shock, the region with real wage rigidity experiences higher inflation and a stronger fall of hours worked and output, which is also reflected in a deterioration in its competitiveness. Due to the presence of DWR, policy-controlled interest rates need to respond by more to negative than to positive productivity shocks.
Second, the presence of asymmetric productivity shocks between the two regions does not give rise to a positive grease inflation. In this case, a negative productivity shock in one region requires a strong rise of producer prices in that region and an improvement of the terms of trade in order to bring the international goods market back to equilibrium. This automatically supports the necessary negative relative adjustment of the real wage, which makes downward rigidity less prominent and its asymmetric impact on inflation less important.
In the rest of this paper, we first outline the monetary union model with costly wage and price adjustments in Section II. Section III discusses the baseline calibration. The results are described in Section IV, and Section V contains the main conclusions.
II. The Model
This section describes the monetary union model with two regions. In each region, households offer specialised labour services and set nominal wages monopolistically, and firms produce specialised consumption goods and set prices monopolistically. Wage and price adjustments are costly. Consumption consists of a basket of specialised goods from the home and foreign region.
The model follows mainly Benigno (2004) and Poilly and Sahuc (2008) for the set-up of the monetary union, Erceg et al. (2000) for the labour market, and Kim and Ruge-Murcia (2009) for the adjustment cost function of wages.
Consumption Aggregation
The economy consists of a continuum of infinitely lived households distributed on the unit interval [0, 1] and living in two regions, home H and foreign F. Households [0, n) live and work in region H and households [n, 1] live and work in region F. Labour is immobile across regions. Households consume Dixit-Stiglitz aggregates of domestic and imported goods and supply differentiated labour services monopolistically.
3 All households have identical preferences and initial endowments. As the household's problem is identical for the two regions, we describe here only one region to save on notation.
Households in the home and foreign region maximise a utility function separable over time and between consumption and hours worked:
where h t (i) represents hours worked by household i, χ represents the elasticity of labour disutility of work, and C t (i) represents the household's consumption of the bundle composed of home and foreign goods defined as
(2) C Ht and C Ft represent the consumption bundle of home-and foreignproduced goods. They are aggregated with an elasticity of substitution of ω, and η, η * are the degrees of preference for goods produced in the consumer's region of residence. Consumers in the home region prefer goods produced in the home region if η > 1/2; if η * > 1/2, foreign consumers prefer goods produced in region F. Cost minimisation implies a demand for the composite home-and foreign-produced goods depending on aggregate consumption at home and abroad.
where P Ht and P Ft are, respectively, the prices for home-and foreignproduced consumption bundles, identical across regions due to an assumed law of one price between regions (see further details below). While producer prices are equated between regions, the utility-based consumer price index (CPI) is not necessarily identical across regions due to the home bias in consumption:
P t and P * t are the CPIs in the home and foreign region, respectively. The regional consumption goods C Ht and C Ft are themselves composites of differentiated goods produced monopolistically by the firms in the two regions. The aggregators for the region-specific production are
where c t (h) and c t ( f ) are consumption of differentiated consumption goods in the home and foreign region, respectively, σ is the elasticity of substitution between goods, and n characterises the size of the region. Cost minimisation implies a demand for an individual product as a function of overall production and relative prices:
where p t (h) and p t ( f ) are the prices the individual firms set in each region. We assume that the law of one price holds; that is, prices at home and abroad are identical:
This implies that the producer price indices for bundles produced at home and abroad P Ht and P Ft are identical across regions as already used in (3). They are defined as the unit price for a home and foreign production bundle:
Terms of Trade. The terms of trade are defined as the relative prices of foreign-to home-produced goods:
where the second equality holds due to the law of one price. They represent an index of competitiveness and play a crucial role in the transmission of asymmetric shocks in the two regions. We can express the consumer price index (4) in the two regions in terms of using the terms of trade:
thus linking consumer prices to producer prices. The real exchange rate, the ratio of relative CPIs, RER t = P * t /P t , can be expressed as the ratio of the home and foreign producer prices using equation (9):
Total demand directed towards a single producer in the home and foreign region stems from n households in the home region and (1 − n) households in the foreign region. Aggregating demands for home and foreign bundles (3), combining it with the aggregators within each region (5), and taking into account the relative region sizes yields the overall demand directed to a single producer in the home and foreign region, as follows:
where we also used equations (4) and (8). Demand for an individual product depends on the home bias and the relative size of the two regions. Consumption equalisation across regions is achieved if η = η * = n, as shown in Benigno (2004) .
Households. Each individual household is a monopolistic supplier of differentiated labour services, which are aggregated for each region in a Dixit-Stiglitz fashion following Erceg et al. (2000) :
where θ is the elasticity of substitution for differentiated labour services. Households set nominal wages taking firm's labour demand into account and incur wage adjustment costs t , which take the form of an altered linex cost function similar to Varian (1974) : ν ∈ [0, 1] captures the degree of indexation. In the absence of indexation, ν = 0; if ψ > 0, adjustment costs for nominal wage increases are smaller than those for nominal wage cuts of the same size, capturing asymmetries in nominal wage adjustments. This case represents DNWR. If ν = 1 and ψ > 0, the asymmetry is around the inflation rate chosen for indexation and captures DRWR. 6 The specification nests a quadratic function, Figure 1 gives a visual impression of a symmetric and asymmetric adjustment cost function, with and without indexation ind t around a positive inflation rate. Our specification differs from the one used in Kim and Ruge-Murcia (2009) , who instead opted for the linex function as proposed by Varian (1974): 7 6 We also consider an alternative functional form encompassing DNWR and DRWR explicitly. If inflation is positive, DRWR is binding; when inflation is at or below zero, DNWR is binding. In the context of an optimal monetary policy, the results are similar to those of the DNWR case. They are available upon request. 7 See further discussion of the properties of the function in Kim and Ruge-Murcia (2009) .
The advantages of our specification (12) are two-fold. First, variations in the asymmetry parameter ψ alter nearly exclusively the costs for wage cuts, but they leave the costs for wage increases unaltered relative to the symmetric case. With the original linex function, instead, ψ increases adjustment costs for wage cuts, but at the same time it reduces adjustment costs for wage increases. Second, at the minimum, the first and second derivatives are identical between specifications. The third derivative is zero in the quadratic case, φψ in the case of the linex function, and ψ in our specification. Hence, the third derivative in specification (12) has the advantage of being entirely characterised by a single parameter, as opposed to the case of the linex function.
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Both specifications presented here imply a smooth adjustment of wages, which allows us to use perturbation methods. Such a smooth adjustment is, however, very different from the evidence in micro studies of wage adjustments that show a spike at either zero (DNWR) or at the inflation rate (DRWR). The alternative assumption of fixed costs of changing wages typically generates a zone of inaction around the point considered for asymmetry-see, for example, MacLeod and Malcomson (1993), Holden (1994 Holden ( , 2004 , or Holden and Wulfsberg (2009) . Carlsson and Westermark (2008) develop a macroeconomic model in which wage cuts are completely excluded. This requires a different solution algorithm (based on projections) than the perturbation methods that are used in this paper. Fagan and Messina (2009) use a flexible menu-cost model to match wage change distributions at the micro level in a number of countries. However, they can only solve for the steady-state equilibrium and do not analyse the dynamics. From a macroeconomic perspective, Thomas (2002) and King and Thomas (2006) have shown that using convex adjustment costs is approximately observationally equivalent to a set-up with heterogeneous menu costs. Nevertheless, depending on the set-up, differences in the quantitative implications may persist and the welfare consequences may be different.
Household Optimisation. The household maximises utility (1) subject to the consumption aggregators (2) and (5), wage adjustment costs (12), and the intertemporal budget constraint
Households use their funds to purchase a composite consumption good C t (i) and non-contingent bonds B t (i) that earn nominal interest rates I t . They obtain income from working h t (i) hours for a nominal wage rate W t (i) net of wage adjustment costs t (i) and from dividend payments D t , as households are the owners of the firms. The first-order conditions with respect to consumption and bond holdings yield the consumption Euler equation for households:
and the optimality conditions for wages lead to a wage Phillips curve:
The wage Phillips curve relates nominal wage increases to the marginal rate of substitution and wage adjustment costs in a forward-looking manner. Convex adjustment costs lead households to smooth wage adjustments over time, implying wage rigidity. Instead, if there are no adjustment costs, (16) becomes
and wages are merely a mark-up θ/(θ − 1) over the marginal rate of substitution.
Fundamental Risk-sharing Condition. With a full set of contingent assets, the marginal utility of each agent is equalised within and across regions. The Euler equations (15) of households in the two regions lead to a relationship between the real exchange rate and the consumption levels in the two regions:
where
is a constant including only initial conditions for asset holdings. We assume that initial wealth and price levels between the regions are identical, implying ψ 0 = 1. The real exchange rate is proportional to relative consumption in the two regions. With home bias in consumption, complete markets do not lead to identical consumption.
Firms
Firms in each region produce differentiated goods using labour as unique input:
The production function exhibits decreasing returns to scale; productivity is stochastic and consists of a union-wide component, A t , and a regionspecific one, x Jt , J = {H , F}. All firms act individually and face an identical optimisation problem in the home and foreign region; we therefore present here only the problem of the firm in one region. The firm's objective is to maximise the infinite discounted stream of profits in real terms using the households discount factor because as households are the owners of the firms:
is the stochastic discount factor and P Jt is the CPI in the firm's region. The per-period profits consist of revenue net of price adjustment costs t ( j) and net of wage payments for hours worked. The demand for labour is obtained from cost minimisation of the labour service aggregator (11), h t ( j) = (W t (i)/W Jt ) −θ h Jt /n, where h Jt denotes the composite labour service from workers in the firm's region, W t (i) are nominal wages for the single labour services provided by household i, and W Jt are nominal wage indices for the composite labour service defined as
Firms maximise (19) by setting the product price p t ( j) and demanding labour input h t (i) from their region while taking into account the product demand function from households (3) and the Rotemberg (1982) -style price adjustment cost function:
In contrast to wages, price adjustment costs are assumed to be symmetric in line with the empirical evidence on micro price changes-see, for example, Altissimo et al. (2006) .
The firms' optimisation yields a labour demand that equates the marginal product of labour in nominal terms to the nominal wage in the region:
and the optimal pricing equation is a forward-looking Phillips curve:
The Phillips curve relates intertemporally growth in prices to current and future marginal costs of production. If prices are flexible,
In this case, prices are set as a constant mark-up σ /(σ − 1) over nominal marginal costs.
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Monetary Policy
The analysis considers an optimal Ramsey monetary policy that maximises the weighted welfare of households in the home and foreign region. It sets interest rates for the monetary union as a whole. The policy operates under full commitment, takes the optimisation conditions of households and firms into consideration:
(24) The constraints for the optimal monetary policy are the first-order conditions of the household for wage-setting (16) and the firm's pricesetting equation (22), as well as the resource constraints (25). The monetary authority optimises with respect to a sequence of the variables
Shocks
As shown in equation (18), productivity of firms is affected by two types of productivity, influenced by a union-wide shock ε at , and a regionspecific shock ε Ht . They all follow an autoregressive process captured by
Ht . Productivity levels follow an AR(1) process. The innovations ε at and ε Ht are i.i.d. and are drawn from the Normal distributions N (0, σ a ) and N (0, σ x ), respectively. The asymmetric shock is a perfectly negatively correlated shock between the regions. This specification allows us to analyse the pure cross-region effects of asymmetric shocks.
Resource Constraint and Equilibrium
All households and firms in the home and foreign region are ex-post identical; we can therefore drop individual subscripts. Production in the economy is used for consumption by households or for wage and price adjustments, which represent a deadweight loss to aggregate value-added. Consumption within each region J is production net of price and wage adjustment costs, and , respectively, whereby the price adjustment costs are borne by the firm while the wage adjustment costs are borne by the household:
Aggregate real wages are defined as w = nh H w H + (1 − n)h F w F . The equilibrium is defined as an allocation for region J for variables (14), (15), (16), (21), and (22) 
Computational Solution
The model has been set up to analyse the asymmetric behaviour within a monetary union to symmetric and asymmetric productivity shocks. In order to address this question adequately, the solution algorithm needs to account for the asymmetry in wage adjustment costs. To approximate the solution around the steady state, we use a second-order perturbation method based on Judd and Guu (1997) and implemented in Dynare following the algorithm by Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004). The Ramsey optimisation employs the algorithm implemented in Dynare by Lombardo and Sutherland (2007) , which itself is similar to the one used by Levin et al. (2005) .
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Simulations with second-order approximations exhibit the possibility of explosive paths due to the existence of an approximation-induced second steady state, which is unstable. In order to remain on the stable path, we implement in Dynare the pruning algorithm proposed by Kim et al. (2008) and made it available on the Dynare website.
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III. Calibration
In order to solve the model numerically, it needs to be calibrated. As discussed in the Introduction, the euro area can be characterised as consisting of a number of countries with DNWR (e.g., Germany, Italy, Portugal) and a number of countries with DRWR (e.g., Belgium, Cyprus, Spain). This paper's main purpose is to investigate the implications of this heterogeneity in wage setting for monetary policy in the monetary union. A full calibration to the euro area is not feasible, however, for two main reasons. First, the European monetary union started in 1999 and therefore the time series are too short to estimate higher-order moments, such as skewness, with any precision. Second, it is difficult to capture the 16-country monetary union in two relatively homogeneous regions. The calibration is therefore intended to characterise a stylised monetary union wherein the home region exhibits DRWR and the foreign region exhibits DNWR. As is the case in most euro area countries with explicit indexation, wages in the home region are assumed to be indexed to inflation in that region. Asymmetries around this point may exist due to several reasons, such as labour market institutions, efficiency wages, and wage-bargaining set-ups. For simplicity, we assume that all the other parameters are identical and that both regions are equal in size. Table 1 summarises the benchmark calibration. We distinguish three types of parameters. The first is a set that we take as standard in the literature; a second set deals with the asymmetry in wage adjustments; and a third set concerns the shock processes, which are calibrated to match the volatility and persistence of euro area output. The model is calibrated to quarterly data.
Values from the Literature. The household's discount factor β is set to 0.992, reflecting a real interest rate of 3.3%. The elasticity of labour disutility takes a standard value of χ = 1.5. The value for κ in the household's utility function is chosen such that hours worked in the nonstochastic steady state equals one. Production consists exclusively of labour input characterised by decreasing returns to scale with a labour elasticity of 0.64; that is, α = 0.36. The aim is to reproduce increasing marginal costs when production expands through more hours worked. The two regions are characterised by the same degree of home bias in consumption preferences, namely η = 0.8 (η * = 0.2) following Poilly and Sahuc (2008) , and by an elasticity of substitution ω between home and foreign goods of 1.5. This value is higher than the one used in Corsetti et al. (2008) , to account for the relatively integrated goods markets within Europe.
The elasticity of substitution between goods σ is set to 11, which implies a mark-up of 10% and represents the lower bound of estimates by Vermeulen and Christopoulou (2008) . The elasticity between individual labour services θ, instead, takes the value of 3.5, reflecting a much larger mark-up of around 40% in the labour market, but in line with Smets and Wouters (2007) .
Price adjustment costs are identical across regions and are symmetric, as found within the Inflation Persistence Network summarised by Altissimo et al. (2006) . For the convexity parameter of price adjustments γ , we pick a value of γ = 45, which is consistent with a Calvo parameter of about ζ = 0.63 used in a variety of estimated Phillips curves (such as Smets and Wouters, 2007) and which represents a mean price duration of about three quarters. 12 The value used here is slightly larger than the value of 37 obtained through an estimation for the US by Kim and 12 See Table 1 in Khan (2005) for converting the convexity parameter into a Calvo parameter. The degree of convexity is γ = ζ (θ − 1)/((1 − ζ )(1 − ζ β)), where ζ is the probability of not changing prices in a given quarter, θ is the elasticity of substitution between goods, and β is the discount factor. A similar equation can be put forward for labour market rigidities.
Ruge-Murcia (2009), reflecting a higher persistence in inflation for the euro area.
Wage Rigidity. Wage rigidities in the two regions are captured by the convexity parameter φ and the asymmetry parameter ψ in the adjustment cost function (12). With the exception of the indexation parameter, the parameters are assumed to be identical across regions. The convexity parameter is set in a similar fashion as the one for price adjustments by converting Calvo estimates. According to the findings of the Wage Dynamics Network (WDN), wages in the euro area on average change once a year, translating in a Calvo probability of not changing wages of 0.76 per quarter. Together with the elasticity of substitution between labour services, this translates into φ = 32. The degree of asymmetry ψ is set to 26,000. This value is smaller than those estimated by Kim and Ruge-Murcia (2009) for the US and implies a lower degree of asymmetry, once one takes into account the different adjustment cost function. In the sensitivity analysis, we investigate the impact of a higher asymmetry parameter.
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Matching the Volatility and Persistence of Output. We calibrate the persistence and size of the aggregate and asymmetric productivity shocks to match the volatility, autocorrelation, and cross-region correlation of output in the euro area. The resulting standard deviation of aggregate shocks is σ a = 0.11, and the relative size of asymmetric shocks is σ h = 0.4σ a . The latter value pins down a cross-correlation between the two regions of about 0.73. This is in the range of the correlations between the four major economies of the euro area. Finally, the persistence of both types of shocks are identically set to ρ a = ρ h = 0.9 to match the autocorrelation of output of the four major countries.
IV. Results
The calibrated monetary union model can now be used to study the implications of DNWR and DRWR for the performance of the monetary union under optimal monetary policy. The first subsection below focuses on how downward rigidity affects the moments of inflation, wages, and hours worked. The second subsection discusses the average dynamics of the economy in response to aggregate and asymmetric productivity shocks. 13 The values by Kim and Ruge-Murcia (2009) are φ KRM = 280.4 and ψ KRM = 3,844.4. Converting these into a comparable parameter value for the adjustment cost fuction used here leads to ψ = ψ KRM φ KRM = 1,077,970, a multiple larger than our calibrated value of 26,000. One reason for sticking to the lower value in the benchmark calibration is that we found that approximation errors increase with the degree of asymmetry and affect most moments only marginally. First, under the baseline calibration, average inflation is positive but relatively small at 21 basis points per year. A small positive inflation rate helps to grease the economy in the presence of downward nominal wage rigidity, as highlighted by Tobin (1972) . The greasing effect of inflation is precautionary: it reduces adjustment costs following a negative productivity shock that requires a negative real wage adjustment. These effects are, however, smaller than those found in a similar closed-economy model estimated on US data by Kim and Ruge-Murcia (2009) , due to a number of differences that we discuss in turn. First, if wages are automatically indexed to past inflation in part of the monetary union, inflation becomes less effective in greasing the economy. As demonstrated in line 3 of Table 2 , average inflation becomes zero if both regions exhibit DRWR. In contrast, if both regions are subject to DNWR, grease inflation more than doubles increases to 33 basis points. This is closer to the estimate of 39 basis points for grease inflation in the US by Kim and Ruge-Murcia (2009) , but our value of wage asymmetry is smaller than the converted one that they used. A second factor that matters for the optimal average inflation rate is the degree of price rigidity, which in turn is determined by how costly price changes are. If prices are very rigid (line 4), a positive inflation rate in steady state generates large costs, which may offset the benefits in the face of DNWR. As a result, the optimal average inflation rate will be lower. In contrast, when prices are very flexible (line 5), then the optimal average inflation increases. To the extent that price rigidity has been shown to be higher in the euro area than in the US (see Altissimo et al., 2006) , one can argue that the optimal inflation rate should be lower in the euro area than in the US. Finally, the presence of asymmetric shocks also reduces the greasing effects. If real wages are higher in one region compared to another, an efficient reallocation of production reduces production costs and reduces price pressures. Indeed, as we will see, a monetary union with exclusively asymmetric shocks induces disinflationary pressures counteracting the greasing effects of the aggregate shocks.
Steady-state Effects
Turning to the steady-state volatilities of inflation and wage changes in Table 2 , it is clear that the volatility of wage inflation is higher than that of inflation. Volatility of wage inflation is also larger in the region with real wage rigidities. More generally, we find that the volatility in wage inflation increases with the degree of asymmetry in wage adjustments. This is in contrast to Elsby (2009) and Benigno and Ricci (2010) , who argue that DNWR also leads to smaller wage increases because of the irreversibility of these increases. This results in a compressed wage change distribution. In addition to the fact that a second-order approximation may not be sufficient to capture those irreversibility effects, different features in the model that may partly explain this difference are the existence of an alternative margin of adjustment through prices and the presence of optimal monetary policy as well as the international setting that may counteract binding constraints in other settings. These features tend to reduce the irreversibility effect by accommodating through higher inflation.
Finally, the positive skewness in wage inflation induced by the asymmetric adjustment costs also leads to positive skewness in inflation and the nominal interest rate, though to a lower degree. The nominal wage distribution exhibits skewness under both DNWR and DRWR, although DRWR does not lead to grease inflation whereas DNWR does.
The standard deviation and skewness of real wages and hours worked for each region are presented in Table 3 . It is evident that hours worked are highly negatively skewed under both DNWR or DRWR, but more so for DNWR. The effect on the steady-state amount of hours worked is very small (not shown). The income and substitution effects of a higher average real wage have the tendency to offset each other. This result may appear to be in contrast with Akerlof et al. (1996) (as well as Holden, 1994) , who find relatively large negative steady-state effects on unemployment. However, note that in this economy there are no turnover costs and there is no unemployment, so it is difficult to make a comparison. Somewhat surprising is the fact that real wages exhibit only small asymmetries. Figure 2 shows the sensitivity of grease inflation to the convexity parameter φ and the asymmetry parameter ψ. Stronger convexity φ leads to lower grease inflation as it becomes more costly to have positive wage changes. The more asymmetric the wage adjustment, the higher the steadystate inflation, particularly if symmetric wage rigidity is low. The steady-state results reported above also depend on the volatility of the shocks. In linear models, changes in the shock volatility alter the volatility of the endogenous variables proportionally, but they have no effect on their mean or skewness. Non-linear models are different. Figure 3 depicts the relationship between the size of the volatility of the aggregate and asymmetric productivity shocks and the optimal grease inflation rate. As is clear from the figure, this relationship depends on the type of productivity shock. Grease inflation increases in the volatility of the aggregate productivity shock. If those shocks were four times as volatile as in the benchmark calibration, the optimal average inflation rate would rise to above 1%. Higher aggregate volatility increases the likelihood and the cost of a necessary fall in real wages and therefore increases the value of grease inflation. Somewhat surprisingly, the size of the volatility of asymmetric shocks has, if anything, a small deflationary effect on mean inflation. Following a negative productivity shock in the home region and a positive shock in the foreign region, the relative price of the home good has to rise, leading to a deterioration in the terms of trade in the home region, whereas the price of the foreign good will fall, inducing more consumption of the foreign good. This rise in home prices by itself reduces demand for the good of the home region, reducing home production in comparison to the foreign region. The union as a whole is thereby shifting production between regions towards the more productive region, which ultimately reduces union-wide prices. The relative price developments support the necessary real wage adjustment, which implies that downward wage rigidity in the home region appears less binding. Taken together, the union-wide productivity shock dominates the greasing effect by far.
Dynamic Effects
In this subsection we discuss the average dynamics of the economy following large positive and negative productivity shocks.
14 First, we analyse an aggregate shock, affecting technology in both regions in the same way, but with differing effects on other variables. Next, we investigate the effects of an asymmetric shock, which is perfectly negatively correlated across both regions. The size of the impulses used for illustration is two standard deviations. Such large shocks are better suited for illustrating the asymmetric responses by forcing the state variables into the asymmetric part of the model adjustment.
Aggregate, Union-wide Productivity Shocks. An aggregate shock to the monetary union may have different responses in the two regions due to the presence of DWR and indexation. We first analyse nominal variables, followed by real ones, and finally interest rates and the terms of trade. Regarding nominal wage and price inflation, three observations are worth making. First, in response to a negative productivity shock, nominal wages fall only marginally (because a fall is very costly), while prices take the biggest burden of adjustment. This is illustrated in the left panels of Figure 4 . The opposite happens in response to a positive shock. Wages rise strongly on impact, reflecting the rise in productivity, while inflation falls less in absolute value. Second, the differences across the two regions are most apparent following a negative productivity shock due to the combination of DNWR and indexation, illustrated by the second column. Following a negative productivity shock, the nominal wage in the DRWR region is dragged upwards due to indexation, and at the same time it has difficulties adjusting downwards because of downward rigidity. The lack of indexation in the foreign country avoids this adverse phenomenon, and foreign 14 To account for the stochastic nature of the economy, the impulse responses are computed by first generating a stochastic simulation with a sequence of shocks in every period. This sequence of shocks is then augmented by the initial impulse, and a second simulation is run. The response of a given variable to the initial impulse is obtained by taking the difference in the responses generated by the two series. Averaging this procedure over a large number of draws may thereby identify the average response to a given initial impulse in a stochastic environment. nominal wages do adjust downward, though the adjustment is relatively muted. For the benchmark calibration, nominal wages at the aggregate level are rising due to the combination of downward asymmetry and indexation in the home country, which can be seen on the top left panel. Finally, wage growth differentials between the two regions are larger than the inflation differential. This is due to the fact that indexation dominates the adjustment of nominal wages in the home region. Relative differences following positive and negative shocks appear to be less easily detectable for selected real variables. There is, however, a magnified and delayed aggregate response in aggregate hours (see the left panels in Figure 5) . 15 In order to clear the labour market, hours worked fall by much more in response to a negative productivity shock, than they rise following a positive shock. This also leads to an asymmetric response of production and consumption, though to a lesser extent. The panels picturing the differential in the responses together with the panels in the last two columns allow a comparison of the two regions. Real wages adjust more slowly to a negative productivity shock in the DRWR region than in the DNWR region. Indexation in the home region exacerbates the negative response in hours worked, even beyond the asymmetry due to DWR. Regional differences in the response of real wages and hours are much weaker after a positive shock. It therefore appears that DNWR in combination with indexation leading to DRWR is particularly detrimental for the adjustment of the labour market. This in turn affects relative production in the two regions and their relative competitive position.
The trade deficit and the terms of trade may be used as indicators of relative competitiveness of the two regions. The trade deficit is defined for the home country as consumption minus net production in real terms. The Nom. interest rate 2σ σ Fig. 6 . Terms of trade (ratio of foreign-to home-producer prices), trade deficit (home consumption minus home production), and nominal interest rates in response to an aggregate shock in a monetary union with benchmark calibration terms of trade are defined as foreign-producer prices over home-producer prices. A deterioration of the terms of trade implies that foreign-producer prices are lower than domestic ones and hence the foreign region appears more competitive. 16 This is indeed the case following a large negative aggregate productivity shock. Both regions face increased production costs translating into higher producer prices, but the home region with DRWR is unable to reduce labour costs due to the combination of downward rigidity and indexation. The home region is hence trapped in a situation of higher prices and wages over a prolonged period of time, making it lose competitiveness and confront a widening trade deficit. Strikingly, a large positive shock is also detrimental for the terms of trade and the trade deficit. The home region with DRWR therefore adjusts with higher inflation than the foreign region, following both positive and negative productivity shocks. This surprising result hinges on two features of the model. First, the 16 The relative increase in total production in the foreign region compared to the home region following the productivity shocks makes foreign goods more abundant relative to home goods. This also reduces relative prices between the two types of goods. asymmetry of wage adjustments is more prominent for larger shocks due to the differing convexity of the adjustment cost function for a different size of wage changes. In fact, this phenomenon is not observed for smaller aggregate shocks, where responses are much more symmetric between positive and negative shocks, neither is it observed for linear approximations. 17 Hence, the negative response of terms of trade is reversed from positive to negative with increasing shock size. This is because prices increase more strongly with larger negative shocks, which simultaneously increases nominal wages due to indexation in the home country. With small shocks, wages may better compensate for the increase in inflation. Second, the secondorder approximation of the asymmetric adjustment cost function implicitly makes large increases less costly than equally sized adjustments in the symmetric case. This leads to a tendency of excessively increasing wages.
Finally, to optimally steer the evolution of prices, the nominal interest rate increases in response to a negative shock by much more than in response to a positive shock. This is necessary to contain inflation and shift consumption to the future. We may conclude that asymmetric wage adjustments and indexation alter the response to aggregate shocks in a non-trivial way. The combination of both features induces a differentiated response between the two regions following an aggregate shock, and this has important consequences for the terms of trade and trade deficits even in a relatively simple model. Stronger effects may be expected if complementary factors in production are introduced, such as human or physical capital accumulation.
Asymmetric, Region-specific Productivity Shocks. Next, we investigate the effects of a perfectly negatively correlated asymmetric productivity shock on aggregate variables in the presence of DWR. In a linearised model with identical regions, such an asymmetric shock has no effects on union-wide variables. In our model this may be different depending on the degree of non-linearities implied by the downward rigidities and other convexities in the model. Figure 7 shows the response of aggregate and country-specific wage and price inflation following a two-standard-deviation asymmetric shock. A negative shock is defined as a negative shock to the home region and a simultaneous positive shock to the foreign region. Three observations are worth making in this context. First, a negative productivity shock at home and a positive one abroad leads to a strong adjustment in relative prices with rising prices at home and falling prices abroad to clear international goods markets. At the same time, this helps the necessary adjustment of real wages, which fall at home (in spite of rising nominal wages due to indexation) and increase abroad. Second, the aggregate effects of the asymmetric shock on union-wide wage and price inflation are small. A negative productivity shock in the home region has the tendency to shift some of the burden of adjustment in prices to the foreign region. However, as can be seen from the lower left panel, the resulting asymmetry in wage adjustment is again quite small. A small deflationary bias is noticeable but appears quantitatively unimportant.
Third, the role of optimal monetary policy in the presence of asymmetric shocks in a monetary union with heterogeneity in DWR and indexation is very limited. It turns out to be a bit more accommodative if the region with DRWR is hit by an adverse productivity shock, but the quantitative importance is small. The result confirms findings from linearised models that monetary policy for the aggregate lacks instruments in stabilising the economy in the presence of purely asymmetric shocks. An important ingredient for a smooth functioning of a monetary union are integrated markets and a smooth functioning of the current account to easily reallocate production across regions.
V. Conclusion
Downward nominal and real wage rigidities introduce distortions in the adjustment to productivity shocks. This paper highlighted to what degree these rigidities become important in a monetary union with different types of downward wage rigidity (nominal or real) across regions and how this affects welfare-maximising monetary policy.
The main findings are as follows. First, in the presence of aggregate, union-wide productivity shocks, downward nominal wage rigidities lead to a positively skewed response in nominal wage changes and a positive optimal inflation rate, as already indicated by Tobin (1972) and formalised more recently by Kim and Ruge-Murcia (2009) and Benigno and Ricci (2010) . The analysis confirms that greasing effects increase with higher aggregate volatility and with lower price rigidity; but for reasonable calibrations, the grease inflation appears to be small. The presence of a region with indexed wages further reduces the optimal size of grease inflation.
Second, in response to a common negative productivity shock, DWR together with wage indexation leads to delays in the downward adjustment of real wages and creates detrimental effects on hours worked and production. When the degree of indexation differs across countries, the terms-of-trade effects in response to a common aggregate shock can be sizeable and persistent. A striking finding is that the region characterised by real rigidity adjusts to both large positive and negative productivity shocks with a persistent loss of competitiveness. For smaller aggregate shocks, this result does not hold.
Third, in the benchmark calibration, only aggregate volatility leads to a positive optimal inflation rate, while asymmetric shocks imply small deflationary tendencies. In response to asymmetric productivity shocks, the adjustment mechanism is dominated by the adjustment of relative prices, which in turn facilitate real wage adjustment even in the presence of indexation.
Fourth, in the presence of DWR, the optimal response by the monetary authority is strongly asymmetric. Following a negative aggregate productivity shock, the nominal interest rate rises more strongly-to contain inflation and postpone consumption-than it falls following a positive shock. The response becomes more persistent if wages are indexed, to take into account the detrimental effects on real variables.
